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BOOK REVIEWS

Religious Commitment and Secular Reason, by Robert Audi. New York:

Cambridge, 2000. Pp. xix, 355. $54.95 (cloth).
FRANCIS J. BECKWITH, Trinity International University
Robert Audi's latest work on church/ state relations is an important contribution to the ongoing debate in political philosophy and legal theory
over political liberalism and its requirement that the state remain neutral
between competing views of the good life and for the state's citizenry and
elected officials to use public or secular reasons and motivations when
advancing particular policies. Its purpose is to address "the delicate problem of how a free and democratic society can achieve an appropriate harmony between religion and politics" (2)
This monograph is a highly nuanced, though clearly and tightly argued,
defense of one form of political liberalism. Thus, I will attempt to briefly,
though no doubt inadequately, summarize its contents. I will then discuss
two points that I believe some Christian philosophers may have particular
interest.
Overview of Book

This book consists of seven chapters, each of which deals with some
aspect of church/ state relations. Part One (The Foundations of Democracy
and the Separation of Church and State) contains three chapters. Chapter 1
(The Plurality of Paths to Liberal Democracy) presents a definition of liberal
democracy and then considers a number of different moral traditions on
which one may ground liberal democracy (Utilitarianism, Instrumentalism,
Kantianism, Virhle Ethics, Communitarianism, Theology, Intuition and
Common Sense). Audi explores the strengths and weaknesses of each, concluding that "liberal democracy is supportable from a variety of plausible
starting points" (27). It is unclear why Audi does not mention the natural
law tradition as a basis on which one may ground liberal democracy
(though he does mention natural law elsewhere in the text), especially since
the American Founders,] President Abraham Lincoln/ and a number of
contemporary philosophers3 defend liberal democracy by appealing to natural law. Audi concludes this chapter with an analysis of freedom and
coercion, concluding that when a proposed public policy demands coercion, liberty is the default position if the coercion's justification is in dispute
among reasonable citizens.
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Chapter 2 (The Separation of Church and State) is the core of Audi's
view of church/state relations. In this chapter he discusses, among other
things, his three central principles of church-state separation: the libertarian principle (lithe state must permit the practice of any religion, though
within limits" [32]), the equalitarian principle ("the state may not be given
preference to one religion over another" [33]), and the neutrality principle
("the state should neither favor nor disfavor religion ... as such, that is, give
positive or negative preference to institutions or persons simply because
they are religious" [33]). Combining these principles, Audi defends his
version of political liberalism as it pertains to church/state relations. He
applies his view to a number of issues including the role of clergy in a liberal state and certain issues in public policy (e.g., public observances, educational policy, and tax exemption).
Although I do not know how conversant Audi is in the leading
church/state cases decided by the U.s. Supreme Court, it is interesting to
note that his philosophical reasoning is consistent with the dominant interpretation of those decisions. I make this point because it is a testimony to
Audi's philosophical acumen that his case for the logic of the Court's holdings in these decisions is, in my judgment, far more sophisticated and compelling than the arguments made by the justices who authored those opinions. If I were to embrace Audi's view, it would be because of Audi's firstrate arguments and not because of the second-rate philosophy that permeates the Court's modem church/ state jurisprudence.
Chapter 3 (Church-State Separation and the Justification of Govemment
Power) deals with the relationship between government coercion and religious reasons, and the role of those reasons in developing and supporting
public policies. Audi suggests what he calls a surrogacy model of justified
coercion: the justification of coercion can rely only on public reasons that are
not connected to any particular ethical tradition and which any rational citizen would accept. As he writes elsewhere in the book: "If fully rational citizens in possession of the relevant facts cannot be persuaded of the necessity
of coercion-as is common where the coercion is based on an injunction
grounded in someone else's scripture or revelation-then from the point of
view of liberal democracy, the coercive action lacks an adequate basis. (123)
Audi does not deny that one may have religious reasons, but that in order to
coerce fellow citizens one must have appropriate secular reasons as well.
Part Two (The Ethics of Citizenship and the Balance of Religious and
Political Arguments) is perhaps Audi's most creative contribution to
church/ state relations. In chapter 4 (Religious Convictions and Secular
Reasons) Aud; explores further what he introduced to the reader in chapter 3. Although his general focus is on advocacy, he delves into numerous
other questions including the responsibility of citizenship, public persona,
virtuous conduct, and the delicate balance between the free exercise of religion and its establishment.
Chapter 5 (Religion and Ethics) concerns the web of interconnected
philosophically-derived and theologically-derived ethical beliefs embraced
by religious people. Audi carefully, and with philosophical deftness,
defends what he calls the principle of theo-ethical equilibrium: "a rational
integration between religious deliverances and insights and, on the other
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hand, secular ethical considerations, including sociopolitical principles of
the kind that determine the level of permissible freedom in a democracy"
(130). So, for example (this is my example, not Audi's), if the deliverances
of one's philosophical reflection leads one to the well-grounded belief that
the unborn are members of the human community and ought to be protected by the wider post-natal community, but one's reading of Scripture leads
one to an ambiguous conclusion about the unborn, one should reexamine
one's understanding of Scripture, since one has independent reasons to
affirm the unborn's personhood. Thus, one must continually balance one's
philosophical and theological insights in order to achieve equilibrium:
Audi maintains that given God's nature theo-ethical equilibrium is to be
expected. He applies this concept to both institutions and individuals.
Although while reading Part Two I found myself at times disagreeing
with Audi, I was struck and moved by his deep concern for the church and
his sincere desire to preserve its integrity against the temptation of using
the power of the pulpit to further partisan political ends. On the other
hand, Audi is careful not to discourage political activism in the church; he
is simply calling for religious people to make principled and theologically
sensitive decisions that will encourage the church's moral vision for society
while at the same time protecting it from the corruption of partisan politics.
In Part Three (Civic Virtue and Political Activism in a Religiously
Pluralistic Democracy) Audi cashes out the principles laid out in Parts One
and Two. The focus of chapter 6 (Civic Virtue) is the role of citizens and
their communities in participating in liberal democracy. Audi stresses the
importance of developing certain virtues in order to nurture good citizenship. In this rich chapter, he discusses the moral ground of civic virtue
(tying it to some notions outlined in chapter 1), civic virtue and the
grounds of sociopolitical action, civic virtue and the balancing of religious
and secular reasons, the place of religious considerations in civic discourse,
and the institutional dimensions of civic virtue.
Chapter 7 (Religious Conviction and Political Activism) concerns several questions surrounding the use and justification of violence and coercion
employed by those who oppose abortion. This chapter proposes "a framework for peaceful coexistence among these parties" in the abortion debate
(182). Audi believes this framework may be applied to other controversial
issues such as assisted suicide, protection of the environment, animal
rights, and genetic research. (More on this below).

Some Critical Observations.
The above is a superficial overview of Audi's book. There are many
issues that he discusses that I simply could not present in the space allotted
me. However, there are some questions that one may raise about Audi's
thesis. The following is a brief presentation of two of those questions.
1. Definition of Religion
Audi defines religion, for church-state purposes, as theistic. Because he
maintains that one needs a secular reason in order to justifiably shape public policy, it would seem that Audi needs a secular reason for defining reli-
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gion in the way that he does. He provides one: "Non-theistic religions (if
indeed there are such in any full-blooded sense of 'religion') pose-other
things equal-far less serious church-state problems. This is in good part
(though not entirely) because theistic religions tend to be in certain ways
authoritarian." (34). But some theists maintain that it is secularism's arrogant, indeed authoritarian, intrusion in public life, and its commitment to a
controversial metaphysics cloaked in neutrality, that has provoked numerous religious believers, who would otherwise be apathetic, to resist this
intrusion. These believers would argue contra Audi that secular liberal ideology, and the religiously held philosophical commitments of its advocates, raise the most important church-state issues.
Consequently, because Audi asserts "that one has a prima facie obligation not to advocate or support any law or public policy that restricts
human conduct, unless one has, and is willing to offer adequate secular
reason for this advocacy or support" (86), one may reject his definition of
religion on that ground. After all, he is asking theists to restrict their conduct in the public square by requiring them to have secular reasons,5 but
many of them may not accept his definition of religion as adequate,
because, among other things, it defines religion in a way that gives an
unfair advantage to philosophical perspectives that function as religions
(epistemologically, ontologically, and metaphysically) in the public and
private lives of many people."
Because it seems reasonable to believe that Audi's view of religion is
flawed (and that non-theistic worldviews are "religious"),? and because he
concedes that "we are unlikely to find any simple, uncontroversial definition of 'religion'," (56) it seems that Audi is employing a disputed view of
religion as a means to restrict the conduct of his fellow citizens, people who
want to employ (what he calls) "religious" reasons in the public square.
Recall one of Audi's principles:
If fully rational citizens in possession of the relevant facts cannot be

persuaded of the necessity of coercion-as is common where the
coercion is based on an injunction grounded in someone else's scripture or revelation-then from the point of view of liberal democracy,
the coercive action lacks an adequate basis. (123)
Let us apply this principle to Audi's definition of religion: If fully rational
citizens (in this case, theistic believers) in possession of the relevant facts
cannot be persuaded of the necessity of coercion (in this case, requiring that
they be legally restrained by the state accepting Audi's definition of religion)-as is common where the coercion is based on an injunction grounded in someone's controversial definition of "religion"-then from the point
of view of liberal democracy, the coercion lacks an adequate basis.
If, as Audi argues (see below), difference of opinion between rational
citizens over the nature of the fetus is adequate to permit abortion, why
cannot a difference of opinion between rational citizens over the definition
of religion be adequate to permit "religious" reasons in the public square?
If, as Audi argues, the abortionist's practice should be protected by the
state by requiring that other citizens including his adversaries presume
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him innocent of lmjust killing, why cannot we extend that tolerance, presumption, and protection to include the deliberations of religious citizens
who see their reasons for particular policies as inexorably tied to their theological commitments and religious practice?
2. Abortion and the Benefit of the Doubt Argument
In his discussion of abortion (in chapter 7), Professor Audi introduces the
reader to an argument he believes will help resolve the political conflict that
the issue has engendered. Audi maintains that because reasonable people
disagree over fetal personhood, the state would err against liberty of its citizens by prohibiting abortion. Although Audi is correct that reasonable people do disagree on this issue, it does not follow from that correct observation that all arguments produced by these reasonable people are equally
reasonable. In addition, if disagreement between reasonable people is sufficient to jettison a viewpoint from being reflected in our laws, as Audi suggests of the prolife position, then Audi's political liberalism should be rejected on the same grounds: reasonable people disagree with it. But perhaps 1
have misunderstood Audi. Maybe he is saying something a bit more modest: when reasonable people disagree on an issue over which liberty itself
hangs in the balance, we should err on the side of liberty. But that does not
do the trick for at least one reason: it is not clear that in the abortion debate
liberty is really the good that is at stake. Let me explain.
Audi argues that there is a good case to permit abortion, for if it were prohibited on the grounds articulated by prolifers-"someone else's religious
attitudes or views" (201 )-then we would be violating the principles of liberal democracy. Audi writes: "If, for instance, labortion'sl moral status in
unclear or, in a certain way, controversial, or both, then there may be great
difficulty in deciding it should be legally prohibited" (195). Audi's case rests
on what he calls the presumption of innocence, "the presumption that, by treating actions as innocent (permissible) unless appropriately proven to be
wrong, in effect corresponds to our normal rights of liberty, moral and
sociopolitical" (200). Ironically, Audi's presumption argument is similar to
one employed by prolifers to argue the very opposite of his position.s
Briefly, the argument goes something like this. If it is true that no one
position on fetal personhood wins the day, this is an excellent reason not to
permit abortion, since an abortion may result in the death of a human entity
who has a full right to life. If one kills another being without knowing
whether that being is a person with a full right to life, and if one has reasonable grounds (as Audi admits) to believe that the being in question is a person, such an action would constitute a willful and reckless disregard for others, even if one later discovered that the being was not an other, a person.
Audi seems to imply that the different positions on fetal personhood all
have able defenders, persuasive arguments, and passionate advocates, but
none really wins the day. To put it another way, the issue of fetal personhood is up for grabs; all positions are in some sense equal, none is better
than any other. But if this is the case, then it is safe to say that the odds of
the fetus being a human person are 50/50. Given these odds, it would
seem that society has a moral obligation to err on the side of life, and therefore, to legally prohibit virtually all abortions.
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Consider this illustration. Imagine the police are able to identify someone as a murderer with only one piece of evidence: his DNA matches the
DNA of the genetic material found on the victim. The police subsequently
arrest him, and he is convicted and sentenced to death. Suppose, however, that it is discovered several months later that the murderer has an identical twin brother, who obviously has the same DNA. This means that
there is a 50/50 chance that the man on death row is the murderer. Would
the state be justified in executing this man? Surely not, for there is a 50/50
chance of executing an innocent person. Consequently, if it is wrong to kill
the man on death row, it is then wrong to kill the fetus when the arguments for its personhood are just as reasonable as the arguments against it.
Oddly, Audi grants the presumption of innocence to the abortionist
rather than the fetus, a being whose status makes the essential moral difference. Thus, it is not clear that in the abortion debate that liberty should be
the default position when there is an even chance that the exercise of that
liberty will result in the unjustified homicide of a human person.

Conclusion
Given the rising importance of religion in our nation's political life,
Professor Audi's careful and thoughtful study is much needed. Although
one may raise questions about some aspects of Audi's work, as I have in
this review, it brings a distinctly Christian voice into the conversation, a
voice that for too long has been drowned out by the secular defenders of
political liberalism and the long and growing list of its Christian and nonChristian critics.~
NOTES
l. See the Declaration of Independence.
2. Harry Jaffa, The Crisis of the House Divided (New York: Doubleday, 1959)
3. See, for example, Jaffa The Crisis of the House Divided; Hadley Arkes,
First Things: An Inquiry Into the First Principles of Morals and Justice (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986); Robert P. George, Making Men Moral:
Civil Liberties and Public Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); John Finnis,
Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980)
4. John Rawls defends a similar view-"reflective eguilibrium"- though,
unlike Audi, he does not have a theological component.
5. That is, by requiring that religious citizens have secular reasons and
motivations in addition to religious ones, Audi is in fact restricting their conduct, for he is saying that they ought not to shape public policy unless they
have such reasons. But if his very definition of "religion" is in dispute among
reasonable people, and that definition is used as a standard by which to assess
the permissibility of a citizen's reasons, Audi is in fact employing his disputed
view of religion in order to coerce his fellow citizens, some of whom do not
believe, for good reason, that the definition is adequate.
6. For philosophical and legal defenses of a broader definition of religion
that includes secular, philosophical, and religious commitments in addition to
theism, see Roy Clouser, The Myth of Religious Neutrality (Notre Dame, IN:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1991); and Joel Incorvaia, "Teaching
Transcendental Meditation in Public Schools: Defining Religion for
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Establishment Purposes," San Diego Law Rl'view 16 (1978-79)
7. See, for example, Clouser, The Myth of Religious Neutrality; and
Incorvaia, "Teaching Transcendental Meditation in Public Schools."
8. See, for example, Francis J. Beckwith, "Ignorance of Fetal Status as a
Justification of Abortion: A Critical Analysis," in The Silent Subject: Reflections
on the Unborn in American Culture, ed. Brad Stetson (Westport, CT: Praeger
Books, 1996)
9. Special thanks to the Board of Regents of Trinity International
University which graciously awarded me a sabbatical for the 2000-01 school
year so that 1 may do work on religion, law, and the public square as part of
my completion of the Master of Juridical Studies degree (M.J.S.) at the
Washington University School of Law in St. Louis. Thanks also to the
Discovery Institute and W. Howard Hoffman, MD., for their financial support.

Body and Soul: Human Nature and the Crisis in Ethics, by J.P. Moreland &
Scott B. Rae. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2000. Pp.384. $22.99.
BRUCE R. REICHENBACH, Augsburg College
It takes a lot of spunk to swim against the intellechwl tide; to do it well
and convincingly takes serious intellectual work. The authors, an ethicist
and a biblical scholar, demonstrate plenty of both in their spirited defense
of Thomistic dualism. They are not alone in their anthropological assessment; their company includes noted contemporary Christian philosophers
like Richard Swinburne, Alvin Plantinga, Charles Taliaferro, and William
Hasker, who espouse divergent types of dualism. But their view will not
be popular in the current cultural milieu.
The first chapter, which sets the stage for the rest of the discussion, establishes the approach the authors intend to take in addressing the issue of the
human person. Rejecting the view that we should "'re-examine the claimed
cognitive content of Christian theology in the light of the new knowledge
derivable from the sciences'" (Peacock), the authors hold that "when it
comes to addressing the nature of human persons, science is largely incompetent either to frame the correct questions or to provide answers" (40-1).
Their method, following the Reformed theological model, is first to "formulate an adequate Christian world view, beginning with biblical teaching and
the contours of church history, then to employ philosophy with a special
emphasis on scriptural teaching, ... guided by common sense beliefs ... and
our own first-person awareness of ourselves and our inner states" (44).
"Philosophy," they conclude, "is autonomous from and more authoritative
than science even in some areas that are properly within the domain of science itself (e.g., the nature of time, space, causation, consciousness, the person)." Finally, "ethical knowledge [is] a source of information for adjusting
the ontological model when appropriate and relevant" (46).
Thus, as expected, the opening chapter contains their fundamental theological and biblical arguments. The philosophical argument goes: "God is
the paradigm case (i.e., clearest example) of a person, and arguably angels
are as well.. .. God is an immaterial reality, most likely an immaterial sub-

